Civil Rights: A New Public Accommodations Law for Ohio by Van Alstyne, William W.
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For the first time in the twentieth century, the Ohio Legislature
has moved forcefully to protect the right of access to places of public
accommodation from racial discrimination.' In one sense new leg-
islation would seem to be wholly unnecessary, for denial of access
to places of public accommodation has constituted a civil and criminal
offense in Ohio ever since the legislature acted in 18842 to fill the
gap created by the Civil Rights Cases.3 But a survey by the Ohio
Civil Rights Commission of seventeen cities in 1960 indicated that
access to thirty-six kinds of public facilities-from inns through thea-
ters-was commonly denied to many Ohio residents.4 A review of the
old public accommodations act disclosed a number of basic defects in
the law itself' and a most conspicuous sign of the law's disrepair was
evident in the skepticism of minority groups. They had turned from
legalistic appeals to the courts based on codified law to extralegal
self-help, i.e., direct nonviolent persuasion such as sit-ins and pick-
eting."
Whether the current legislative effort will recapture the confi-
dence of those it is principally designed to protect and whether it will
encourage the voluntary abatement of sit-ins in Ohio are political
questions beyond anyone's capacity to predict. The purpose of this
comment is merely to review what the law provides, and to anticipate
certain unresolved problems which the Civil Rights Commission must
soon confront. Essentially, the 104th General Assembly has integrated
the public accommodations law with the remedial provisions of the
Fair Employment Practices Act of 1959. Without discarding criminal
and civil remedies already available under Section 2901.35 of the Ohio
Revised Code, the new law provides for relief in the alternative, com-
* Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University.
1 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4112.01-.08 (Supp. 1959), as amended by H.B. 918 (1961).
2 81 Ohio Laws 15 (1884).
3 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
4 Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, Discrimination in Public Accommodations in Ohio,
(multil. Dec. 1960).
5 Van Alstyne, "A Critique of the Ohio Public Accommodations Law," 22 Ohio St.
L.J. 201 (1961).
6 E.g., the several stand-ins held at the Coney Island Amusement Park near
Cincinnati; demonstrations at a Columbus skating rink from which three law suits
resulted.
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mencing with the filing of a verified charge by a complainant. 7 Upon
receipt of a complaint describing an unlawful instance of discrimin-
ation in a place of public accommodation, the Commission is obliged
to conduct a preliminary investigation8 which is to determine the suf-
ficiency of the charge. Where probable cause is established, the Com-
mission must attempt through informal conciliation to persuade the
respondent proprietor to alter his policy to conform with the law. No
publicity is to accompany any part of these proceedings, and thus both
parties may initially be insulated from unwanted public attention.
Should conciliation attempts fail, the case must proceed to a formal
hearing in which the Attorney General shall present the State's evi-
dence,9 all indispensable parties shall be joined, and all interested
parties may be heard at the discretion of the Commission. If the
7 The requirement of a complainant represents a departure from the self-initiatory
power entrusted to the Commission for the purpose of investigating employment
discrimination. Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.05(B), as amended by H.B. 918 (1961). The
legislature evidently felt that the risk of reprisal by employers which might discourage
employees from filing complaints had no parallel in the field of public accommodations.
That the "complainant" need not himself be the victim of discrimination, however, may
be inferred from the provisions that the complaint may be directed against discriminatory
practices in general (§ 4112.05[BI), that relief is to be granted when discrimination
"whether against the complainant or others" has been proved (§ 4112.05[G]), that the
complainant shall be a party to the proceeding apart from others who may be
"indispensable part(ies)" (§ 4112.05[1]), and that "complainant" is not otherwise
limited in the section setting forth definitions with greater particularity (§ 4112.01).
8 The Commission's investigative power has not been specifically defined, and some
question exists as to whether it extends to a right to inspect premises pursuant to a
court order but without the employer's or entrepreneur's consent, and whether it includes
the power to subpoena records. Because the Commission is required to make investiga-
tions and cannot proceed to a hearing unless it finds that discrimination probably exists,
the right to inspect premises at reasonable hours and under judicial supervision, and to
subpoena records, may necessarily be implied, especially since the Commission's enforce-
ment power is not penal. In the only instance of a challenge to the Commission's power
to inspect premises, the employer relented when the Commission announced its intention
to secure a court order. A fully analogous general power to investigate was held
sufficient to imply specific authority to subpoena payroll, membership, bank, tax and
membership meeting records to determine whether respondent was in fact operating a
bona fide private club, in Sun and Splash Club v. DAD, 3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 726
(Super. Ct. N.J. 1957) (1958).
9 Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.05(B), codifies a rule previously adopted by the Com-
mission pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.04(A) (4). Committee debate, of which there
is no official record, indicated that the provision for the Attorney General to present the
case was adopted in an effort to separate the judicial function of the Commission from
its executive function. The effort is unavailing, however, for the Commission still is
charged with receiving and investigating complaints, and with determining whether
probable cause exists to proceed to a formal hearing; whatever danger previously
existed that the Commission acting in its executive capacity will prejudice its neutrality
during the formal hearing lingers on.
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Commission determines that the respondent has unlawfully discrim-
inated, it shall issue a cease and desist order enforceable through con-
tempt proceedings in a court of common pleas sitting without a jury.
Either principal party affected by a Commission order is entitled to
appeal to a court of common pleas for judicial determination that the
Commission's findings of fact are or are not supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole; "legal conclusions"
presumably are to be reviewed independently by the court. In com-
parison with the older remedies of section 2901.35, the advantages
of these provisions become self-evident," although some may regret
that a proprietor is allowed a "free first bite," and others may mourn
the substitution of administrative relief for more traditional judicial
techniques. Nevertheless, the use of administrative agencies in the
field of civil rights is increasingly common." Generally, they have
discharged their duties in a satisfactory manner even from a reason-
ably conservative perspective.'
The 1961 amendments increased the law's coverage in several
other respects: The class of protected persons has been enlarged by
substituting "any person" for "citizen," and defining "person" so as
to include international students, formal and informal associations,
and tourists-thus removing the ambiguity of the older law which
may have been limited to the protection of individual Ohio residents;
discrimination now includes discriminatory acts based on religious
and ancestral animus, as well as those based on race or color; and
finally, the legislature has defined discrimination to include segre-
gation, removing the doubt which prevailed under section 2901.35.11
None of these changes represent any radical departure from recent
legislative policy, because all are fully analogous to provisions already
adopted in the F.E.P. legislation of 1959.1
Certain questions have not been clearly settled by the new law,
however, and something may be added to an otherwise prosaic sum-
mary of the law by examining them here. The most important of
10 Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 209-12.
11 For reference to the laws of twenty-six states affecting discrimination in places
of public accommodation, see Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law 375-79
(1959). See also Emerson and Habor, Political and Civil Rights in the United States
1408-09, 1413 at n.1; Governor's Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on State Laws and
Agencies for Civil Rights (multil Wis. 1960). For recent developments in Idaho, Nevada,
West Virginia, Washington, Indiana, North Dakota, and Oregon, see 6 Race Rel. L.
Rep. 630-650 (1961).
12 Note, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 526 (1961).
13 See Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 206-07 (1961), and Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.01
(G), defining discrimination so as to include segregation.
14 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4112.01-.08 (Supp. 1959).
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these relates to the class of public accommodations which is subject
to the law's proscriptions. In this respect, the legislature seemingly
did no more than to carry over bodily the same description as ap-
peared in the earlier law:
"Place of public accommodation" means any inn, restaurant, eat-
ing house, barbershop, public conveyance by air, land, or water,
theater, store, or other place for the sale of merchandise, or any
other place of public accommodation or amusement, where the
accommodation, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof are
available to the public.
In declining to follow the precedent of New York 15 and the
suggestion of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission 6 to list comprehen-
sively all the types of business establishments to which the law shall
apply, the legislature has repeated its earlier formula of using a
merely illustrative list of establishments followed by an undefined
omnibus clause. It is clear even from judicial construction of the
omnibus clause as it appeared in section 2901.35 that the list is not
to be considered exclusive.' 7  However, the courts otherwise took a
15 N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40; N.Y. Exec. L. Art. 12, §§ 290-301 (1959).
16 Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, supra note 4, at 49-50:
(c) "Places of public accommodation" shall include but shall not be limited
to: (1) inns, hotels, motels, hostels, trailer courts, camps, parks, lodges, resorts,
and other establishments conducted for the recreation, rest, health, or entertain-
ment of transient persons;
(2) restaurants, drive-ins, cafes, dining rooms, lunch counters, soda foun-
tains, buffets, taverns, road houses, barrooms, saloons, and other establishments
where prepared foods, beverages, ice cream, or spiritous or malt liquors are
sold for consumption whether on or off the premises;
(3) theatres, motion picture houses and drive-ins, auditoriums, stadiums,
arenas, music halls, dance halls, roof gardens, golf courses, race tracks, bowling
alleys, skating rinks, billiard and pool parlors, swimming pools, shooting gal-
leries, fairs, carnivals, circuses, rodeos, amusement parks, and other establish-
ments conducted for amusement, recreation, or entertainment;
(4) buses, taxis, limousines, rail cars, airplanes, ships, and other commercial
carriers, terminals, stations, waiting rooms, rest rooms, ticket offices, travel
agencies and all facilities appurtenant to transportation establishment for land,
sea, or air travel;
(5) retail stores and other retail outlets, wholesale and discount houses,
warehouses, auctions, service establishments, parking lots, garages, service
stations, and other enterprises engaged in the sale, rental, repair or servicing
of merchandise, clothes, equipment, food, or other goods, whether on business
premises or not;
(6) barber shops, beauty parlors, bathhouses, reducing salons, and other
establishments conducted for the health, appearance, and physical improve-
ment of persons;(7) dispensaries, clinics, hospitals, convalescent homes, and other institu-
tions for the physically infirm, cemeteries, crematories, and similar establish-
ments.
1- Places of public accommodation within the omnibus clause of Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2901.35 include: a private amusement park, Fletcher v. Coney Island, 54 Ohio Op.
112, rev'd on other grounds, 165 Ohio St. 150, 134 N.E.2d 371 (1956); a golf course,
Gillespie v. Lake Short Golf Club, Inc., 56 Ohio L. Abs. 222, 91 N.E.2d 290 (Ct. App.
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narrow view of "other place of public accommodation,"' 8 but it does
not follow that the Commission should feel bound by this history.
Unlike section 2901.35, the new law is simply an amendment to
the F.E.P. law and thus becomes subject to the legislative admonition
of section 4112.06 that it "shall be construed liberally for the accom-
plishment of the purposes thereof and any law inconsistent with any
provision hereof shall not apply." With this expression of legislative
purpose, the Commission has greater license to depart from the pre-
sumption that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be
narrowly interpreted.19 Similarly, because relief by the Commission
extends only to a cease and desist order rather than to fine and im-
prisonment as under section 2901.35, there is no occasion to confine
construction by characterizing the statute as penal 20 rather than re-
medial.2 ' Thus, the stronger argument is that the legislature employed
the omnibus phrase liberally so as virtually to absorb the whole list
of establishments noted in the Commission's Report. The list may
not have been incorporated literally as a matter of political strategy,
in order to keep adversely affected, special interest groups from not-
ing their specific inclusion early enough to lobby against the bill.
Nevertheless, it is equally clear that the public accommodations
law cannot be used as a carte blanche by the Commission to trench
upon every form of discrimination, as by a homeowner or a garden
club. Some specific guide should surely be observed. In an article
reviewing the scope of California's old public accommodations law,
Professor Harold Horowitz has provided the Ohio Commission with
just such a guide. 2 In defining a "place of public accommodation,"
Professor Horowitz strikes a reasonable balance between the com-
peting interests of those seeking access and service, and those in the
position of entrepreneur, by drawing a line to include establishments in
a place open to a substantial public where the relationship is ordinarily
1950); a bowling alley, Johnson v. Humphrey Pop Corn Co., 4 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 49,
14 Ohio C.C. Dec. 135 (1902); a dance hall, Anderson v. Ohio, 29 Ohio Ct. App. 61, 40
Ohio C.C.R. (ns.) (1918); a motion picture theater, Guy v. Tri-State Amusement Co.,
28 Ohio Ct. App. 231 (1917).
Is See, e.g., Harvey v. Sissle, 53 Ohio App. 405, 5 N.E.2d 410 (1936); Deuwell v.
Foerster, 12 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 329, 30 Ohio Dec. 510 (C.P. Franklin Co. 1912).
19 See Fletcher v. Coney Island, 165 Ohio St. 150, 134 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
20 Ibid. See cases cited supra, note 18; Rice v. Rinaldo, 44 Ohio Op. 28, 95 N.E.2d
30 (C.P. 1950), aff'd, 67 Ohio L. Abs. 183, 119 N.E.2d 657 (Ct. App. 1951); Uhlman v.
Sherman, 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 225, 31 Ohio Dec. 54 (C.P. 1919); Tate v. Eidelman, 32
Ohio N.P. (ns.) 478 (C.P. 1934).
21 For a similar view of Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.35, see the lower courts opinion in
the Coney Island case, supra note 17, at 117.
22 Horowitz, "The California Equal Rights Statute," 33 So. Cal. L. Rev. 360 (1960).
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temporary, sporadic, nonsocial, impersonal, and nongratuitous. Soda
fountains, bowling alleys, swimming pools, travel agencies, business
schools, beauty parlors, clinics, and transient housing are easily in-
cluded. By the same gesture, it is arguable that the more enduring,
less public, and more confidential relationship between doctor and
patient, or attorney and client, is not contemplated, even though such
services may be available to the general public on a nongratuitous
basis, and even though the interest in obtaining such service may be
high.
Similarly, it would take an utter stranger to the Ohio legislature
to construe their purpose as reaching permanent housing. Thus, while
hotels, motels, daily rental units, camps, and trailer courts are rea-
sonably included, it is doubtful whether lessors and homeowners are.
Consequently, though real estate agents might otherwise appear to
operate establishments of public accommodation, 3 it would probably
constitute an unwarranted extension of the law to apply it to them as
an indirect assault on discrimination in the field of permanent hous-
ing. It is significant that the Commission's Report which was distrib-
uted to all the legislators and which occasioned the new legislation
did not include a survey of permanent housing or real estate agency
practices although it did include a survey of trailer court practices.24
Although the legislature has not expressly provided that dis-
tinctly private facilities are exempt from the law, such an exemption
may be inferred in that the law is limited to "place(s) of public ac-
commodation." The problem is, however, to acknowledge the legiti-
macy of certain interests in exclusive association which renders a
place distinctly private, without at the same time swallowing up the rule
that there shall be no discrimination in places of public accommoda-
tion. In certain respects, the same tests which Professor Horowitz
has applied to determine which kinds of business establishments fall
outside the law also apply to this private club problem, but with this
clarification: the facility may be one which ordinarily constitutes a
place of public accommodation, e.g., a golf course, but it may still
operate in such a fashion that it should nonetheless be classified as
"private" so as to vindicate the associational interests of its "mem-
bers." Manifestly, it is impossible to determine the scope of the pri-
vate club exemption by listing types of facilities, for the legitimate
exclusiveness of such clubs is more a function of their internal order
than of the activity which they sponsor. An inn is most conspicuously
23 Cf. Cal. Att'y Gen. Ops., 5 Race Rel. L. Rep. 255 (1960), 6 Race Rel. L. Rep.
354-55 (1961) ; Mass. Att'y Gen. Op., Nov. 24, 1959, 5 Race Rel. L. Rep. 253 (1960).
24 See supra note 4. See also Teverbaugh v. El Key Trailer Parks, 3 Race Rel. L.
Rep. 222 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1958).
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a place of public accommodation, and yet an inn operated exclusively
by and for dues-paying members of the Upper Peninsula Bridge Club
ought not necessarily have to cater to the world at large. And if the
Bridge Club should employ religion or racial qualifications in the
selections of its members, we may respect the desire of the members
to assert these associational preferences in a relatively harmless way,
even though we may take personal exception to the values reflected
by those preferences. At the same time, clearly not every establish-
ment using the "club" label merits a special exemption.2" Particular
cases might best be resolved with the Commission taking evidence
on the following questions:
1. Do the "club members" participate in the organizations'
policy decisions, or do they merely accede to membership
qualifications established by an independent manager, owner
or nucleus of members?
2
'
2. Is the organization a nonprofit association supported by reg-
ular dues and initiation fees, or is it essentially a commercial
establishment operated for profit, with short-term member-
ship cards functionally resembling tickets?27
3. Is it clear that the organization is sustained principally by
the associational interests of its members in one another, or
does it exist principally from the coincidence of interest in
the activity of its sponsors? 28
25 Mich. Att'y Gen. Op., 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1046, 1049 (1957).
26 See the only Ohio case to examine the private club device, Gillespie v. Lake Shore
Golf Club, Inc., 56 Ohio L. Abs. 222, 91 N.E.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1950), infIra note 26.
27 Id. See Crawford v. Kent, 167 N.E.2d 620, 5 Race Rel. L. Rep. 830 (Mass.
S. Ct. 1960), holding a dancing school to be a place of public accommodation partly
because it was a "commercial enterprise," a "business operated for profit"; Peoples v.
Club Primadonna, 5 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1164 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1960), awarding $500
exemplary and $100 actual damages to a Negro and against a subsidiary of a Nevada
"Club" in business in California to sell "reservations to the general public" for tours to
the Nevada club; SCAD v. Trowbridge, 5 Race Rel. L. Rep. 552 (1960), holding that
Trowbridge Farm, advertising in N.Y. papers for "Christian clientele," with facilities for
dining and recreation, operated for profit by a family proprietorship, was a place of
public accommodation. And see Evans v. Ross, 150 A.2d 512 (Camden Cty. Ct. N.J.),
4 Race Rel. L. Rep. 355 (1959), aff'd 154 A.2d 441 (N.J. Super. Ct.), 4 Race Rel. L.
Rep. 1012 (1959), cert. denied, 157 A.2d 362 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1959), 5 Race Rel. L. Rep.
206 (1960).
28 See supra notes 25-27, and see Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury, 208 Misc. 35,
142 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1955), denying a private club exemption where the club had 7,500
adult members, admitted 10,000 annually as guests of members, operated on 16 acres
with 3,780 bathhouses, 2 swimming pools, 32 handball courts, and 10 tennis courts, where
voting rights were confined to six permanent members and regular members had no
authority to influence the club's policy. See also Norman v. City Island Beach Co.,
126 Misc. 335, 213 N.Y. Supp. 379 (1926), exemption denied to swimming club with
lockers for 1,500 and members used only 60 at a time, and the dub generally solicited
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a) How many members are there?
b) How frequent is the turnover in membership?
c) How frequently do the members use the facilities?
d) How many and how regular are the meetings?
e) Is the activity one involving fairly intimate association,
or one with but casual relations between groups?
f) To what extent are those who use the facilities actually
acquainted with one another?
Because of the untested discretionary powers reposed in the Civil
Rights Commission, it is premature to pass judgement on the success
of Ohio's newest effort in the field of civil rights. Nevertheless, the
legislature's act is relatively bold in comparison with developments
in other jurisdictions. 9 It comes as a vigorous reminder that "a State
may choose to put its authority behind one of the cherished aims of
American feeling by forbidding indulgence in racial or religious prej-
udice to another's hurt. '30
members from the public at large; McCarter v. Beckwith, 247 App. Div. 289, 285 N.Y.
Supp. 151 (1936), aff'd 272 N.Y. 488, 3 N.E.2d 882, cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936);
Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383 (1955).
29 See supra note 11.
30 Railway Mail Ass'n v. Coral, 326 U.S. 88, 98 (1945) (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
